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INTRODUCTION
I don’t know whether it was Yogi Berra or Niels Bohr who first
said it—if either of them did—but it’s tough to make predictions,
especially about the future.1 That is certainly true about the next
round of congressional redistricting—the process of drawing the
boundaries of the districts from which members of the House of
Representatives will be elected. In most states, control over drawing
the lines will depend on the outcome of gubernatorial and state
legislative elections in 2018 and 2020. And as has been true since
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wesberry v. Sanders,2 the line-
drawers will once again be crafting their maps under a set of legal
constraints that has changed since the previous round. Mapmakers
in the South and Southwest are free from the preclearance require-
ment and prohibition on racial retrogression that governed the last
five redistricting cycles.3 The Supreme Court has, yet again, refined
the contours of its doctrine forbidding excessive reliance on racial
considerations.4 Depending on the Court’s decisions in Gill v. Whit-
ford and Benisek v. Lamone, states may face new limits on the
degree of permissible partisanship in the redistricting process.5 The
interactive effects of all these rule changes are hard to predict. And
just as in prior decades, there are likely to be some unanticipated
changes as well.
1. Compare The Perils of Prediction, ECONOMIST (May 31, 2007), http://www.economist.
com/node/9253918 [https://perma.cc/4W89-26JV] (ascribing the observation to Berra), with
THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 92 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (ascribing the observation to
Bohr).
2. See 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. See 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (Supp. III 2016) (imposing the preclearance and nonretro-
gression requirements); Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that
the coverage formula that determines which jurisdictions must comply with section 5 is now
unconstitutional).
4. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1478-81 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797-99 (2017). That doctrine originated in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 649 (1993). For the evolution of the Shaw doctrine, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA
S. KARLAN, RICHARD H. PILDES & NATHANIEL PERSILY, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUC-
TURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 906-40, 974-79 (5th ed. 2016).
5. See Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (agreeing to hear the merits of a challenge
to Wisconsin’s state legislative redistricting plan), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017);
Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 543 (2017) (mem.) (agreeing to hear the merits of a challenge
to a Maryland congressional district), argued, No. 17-333 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2018).
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But when it comes to congressional reapportionment—that is, the
process of allocating seats in the House of Representatives among
the states6—there seems to be no real uncertainty. Since 1941, that
process has been the paradigmatic “machine that would go of
itself.”7 Sometime in early 2021, the President will “transmit to the
Congress a statement” of each state’s population “and the number
of Representatives to which each State would be entitled under an
apportionment of the then existing number of Representatives by
the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to
6. Although the terms “redistricting” and “reapportionment” are often used inter-
changeably, as a technical matter, they are not synonymous: “‘Apportionment,’ in the techni-
cal sense, refers solely to the process of allocating legislators among several areas or political
subdivisions, while ‘districting’ entails the actual drafting of district lines. Thus, Congress
‘apportions’ Representatives among the states, while the states ‘district’ by actually drawing
the congressional district lines.” Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404, 410 n.1 (S.D. Tex.
1966) (three-judge court) (quoting Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments:
A Problem of Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968, 970 n.24 (1963)), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); see also ROYCE CROCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42831, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: AN OVERVIEW 1 n.1 (2012) (“The reapportionment
or apportionment process actually refers to assigning seats in the House of Representatives
among the states based on population counts from the decennial census, and is carried out at
the national government level. The redistricting process, or the drawing of boundaries for
congressional districts, occurs within states, and is conducted by the states.”).
7. JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, The Place of the Independent in Politics, in LITERARY AND
POLITICAL ADDRESSES 190, 207 (1890). Russell used this term to describe the entire Con-
stitution—or at least the approach average Americans took to constitutional questions. See
id. His condemnation of the politics of inattention in the 1880s has parallels in our current
climate:
But I think there is a growing doubt whether we are not ceasing to produce
[statesmen], whether perhaps we are not losing the power to produce them. The
tricks of management are more and more superseding the science of govern-
ment. Our methods force the growth of two kinds of politicians to the crowding
out of all other varieties,—him who is called practical, and him of the corner
grocery. The one trades in that counterfeit of public opinion which the other
manufactures. Both work in the dark, and there is need that some one should
turn the light of his policeman’s lantern on their doings.... Could we only have
a travelling exhibition of our Bosses, and say to the American people, “Behold
the shapers of your national destiny!” A single despot would be cheaper, and
probably better looking. It is a natural impulse to turn away one’s eyes from
these flesh-flies that fatten on the sores of our body politic, and plant there the
eggs of their disgustful and infectious progeny. But it is the lesson of the day
that a yielding to this repulsion by the intelligent and refined is a mainly
efficient cause of the evil, and must be overcome, at whatever cost of selfish ease
and aesthetic comfort, ere the evil can be hopefully dealt with.
Id. at 198-99.
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receive less than one Member.”8 And roughly a fortnight thereafter,
unless Congress acts to stop him, the Clerk of the House will send
each governor “a certificate of the number of Representatives to
which such State is entitled.”9 Reapportionment will be over; redis-
tricting will be underway.10
It was not always so. In fact, the post-2020 round of reapportion-
ment will mark the centennial of the most striking episode in the
history of American reapportionment: Congress’s failure, for the en-
tire 1920s, to reallocate seats to reflect the census results.11 The rea-
sons for this failure, and the consequences of Congress’s ultimate
response, continue to shape our politics today.
Historians and political scientists have written excellent studies
of apportionment that address the nonapportionment post-1920.12
But none of these studies focuses directly on the doctrinal concerns
that informed, and then flowed from, these developments. This
Article aims to fill that space. I begin by describing the constitu-
tional structure of apportionment, the questions the Constitution
left open, and how those questions were resolved prior to 1920. I
then turn to what happened in the 1920s and why. Finally, I explore
the aftermath of Congress’s ultimate solution, and how that solution
set the stage for the Reapportionment Revolution of the 1960s. The
story is interesting in its own right, but I also suggest ways in which
8. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012).
9. Id. § 2a(b).
10. Given the current state of U.S. politics, perhaps nothing is really certain. See, e.g.,
Ariel Malka & Yphtach Lelkes, In a New Poll, Half of Republicans Say They Would Support
Postponing the 2020 Election if Trump Proposed It, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/10/in-a-new-poll-half-of-republicans-say-
they-would-support-postponing-the-2020-election-if-trump-proposed-it/?utm_term=.9a79a42
ccdf5 [https://perma.cc/9658-YUQ7]. And observers have expressed concern that inadequate
funding will undermine the Census Bureau’s ability to conduct the full and accurate count
necessary to distribute the seats properly. See Tara Bahrampour, Census Watchers Warn of
a Crisis if Funding for 2020 Count Is Not Increased, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/census-watchers-warn-of-crisis-if-funding-for-2020-
count-is-not-increased/2017/04/17/e6cc170a-20d6-11e7-a0a7-8b2a45e3dc84_story.html?utm_
term=.0e28cbb6fb61 [https://perma.cc/3N7Z-HV5Z].
11. See infra Part II.
12. I found the following particularly useful: MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS:
A SOCIAL HISTORY (1988); MICHEL L. BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION:
MEETING THE IDEAL OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE (2d ed. 2001); CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOCRACY
DELAYED: CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT AND URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920S
(1990); and LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT (1941). 
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the upcoming redistricting will present many of the same questions
that the nation faced a century before.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF APPORTIONMENT BEFORE 1920
The original Constitution provided for the apportionment of seats
in the House of Representatives in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be deter-
mined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including
those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.  The actual
Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first
Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by
Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one
for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least
one Representative.13
Several things about the Apportionment Clause bear note. First, it
clearly requires that seats in the House be allocated on the basis of
population14—in contrast to the Senate, where each state is given
two seats regardless of its size.15 And inherent in the conjunction of
apportionment “according to their respective Numbers,” and the
requirement for decennial “[e]numeration,” is the expectation that
those apportionments will change over time to reflect relative shifts
in states’ populations.16
Second, while the Apportionment Clause sets lower and upper
boundaries on the number of seats in the House—each state must
have at least one,17 so today the smallest House would have fifty
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The provision also determined the number of repre-
sentatives each state would have until the first enumeration was completed, ranging from one
member from Delaware and Rhode Island to ten from Virginia. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Indeed, “equal Suffrage in the Senate” is the one remaining
unamendable part of the Constitution. Id. art. V (providing that “no State, without its
Consent”—and what state would consent?—can be deprived of its equal position).
16. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
17. See id.
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members, and the total number cannot exceed something north of
ten thousand!18—it leaves the exact number unspecified. Implicitly,
determination of that number is confided to Congress and the
political process.
Finally, and most glaring to modern readers, in determining a
state’s representational base, the original Apportionment Clause
counts slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of determining
a state’s population.19 Today, when people think about the three-
fifths clause, they condemn it for the way in which it devalues the
personhood of African American slaves. To be sure, the Framers
deserve condemnation for denying the full humanity of Black peo-
ple, but that is not why they inserted this particular clause into the
document. Rather, the clause was designed to reduce the political
power of the slave states relative to the free states, by discounting
their slave population—who of course would have had no say in how
the representatives apportioned to those states would be selected.20
18. According to the Census Bureau, the total population of the United States on April 1,
2010—the date of the last census—was 308,745,538. See U.S. and World Population Clock,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/J6PU-YRUU]. That
number divided by 30,000 is 10,291.51793333. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
President George Washington vetoed the first post-1790 apportionment on the grounds that
it violated the one representative per 30,000 inhabitants restriction because, although the
ratio of the nation’s total population to the number of representatives complied with the
restriction, the way the seats were allocated meant that some states received more repre-
sentatives than their state population divided by thirty thousand would produce. See U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 449 & n.17 (1992) (describing that history). To
my mind, David Currie persuasively explains why using the national population, rather than
the population of individual states, is the correct reading of the proviso. See David P. Currie,
The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 613-14
(1996). But given the current size of the House, the historical debate is of only academic
interest.
19. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
20. DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION
(2009). As Professor David Waldstricher notes:
Africans and their descendants were not being defined as three-fifths of a
person, as is sometimes said, for that would have implied that the men among
them deserved three-fifths of a vote, when they had none, or had three-fifths of
a person’s rights before the law, when they had much less than that, usually.
Rather, their presence was being acknowledged as a source of power and of
wealth, for their owners.
Id. at 4-5; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 89-90 (2005)
(explaining that northern representatives at the constitutional convention pressed for the
three-fifths clause because otherwise the South would have received additional repre-
sentatives based on its slave population).
2018] REAPPORTIONMENT, NONAPPORTIONMENT 1927
In any case, both the presence and the ultimate elimination of the
three-fifths clause show how racial considerations and sectional
competition have consistently inflected apportionment in America.21
And today, observers invoke the three-fifths clause to criticize the
practice of counting prisoners for apportionment purposes where
they are incarcerated, rather than in the communities from which
they came.22 Prisoners, who are disproportionately persons of color,
serve as electoral ballast in majority-white districts whose residents
have very different interests from theirs.23
But for all the Apportionment Clause does, there is one important
issue on which it is silent: it does not specify the precise method for
allocating seats beyond saying it should be based on the states’
“respective”—that is, relative—populations.24 Because state popula-
tions are not exact multiples of one another, “[n]o method of appor-
tionment ... can assign representatives to the several states in exact
proportion to their respective numbers.”25 There are many methods
for “what to do about the fractions.”26 And the choice among them
matters, because it determines which states get the last couple of
seats up for grabs.27 Different formulas may systematically advan-
tage smaller states over larger ones or vice versa.28 In the context of
21. For discussion of the repudiation of the three-fifths requirement after the Civil War,
see infra text accompanying notes 49-57.
22. See NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., PRISON-BASED GERRYMANDERING &
THE DISTORTION OF OUR DEMOCRACY 2 (2010).
23. See id. at 1-3; Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and
the Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 362 (2011); John C. Drake,
Note, Locked Up and Counted Out: Bringing an End to Prison-Based Gerrymandering, 37
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 237, 262 (2011). For the most comprehensive discussion of this issue,
see generally Prison Gerrymandering Project, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisoners
ofthecensus.org/ [https://perma.cc/MQ2F-RT2V]. For one particularly striking example, see
Emily Bazelon & Peter Wagner, Census’ Cell Count Steals Voting Power, PRISON POL’Y INITIA-
TIVE (Sept. 8, 2004), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2004/09/08/newsday/ [https://perma.cc/
A2YB-7LYY] (reporting that in New York, there are seven state senate districts whose
populations satisfy one person, one vote only because prisoners are counted, and that the
senator from one of those districts “says that he ignores letters from inmates in order to spend
his time on the corrections workers he sees as his real constituents” and supports draconian
drug laws that fill the state’s prisons).
24. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
25. C.W. Doten et al., Report Upon the Apportionment of Representatives, 17 Q.
PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS’N 1004, 1008 (1921).
26. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 1.
27. See id. at 2.
28. See, e.g., id. at 13.
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a particular census, different formulas may give the final seat to a
safely Democratic state or a safely Republican one, thereby chang-
ing the partisan makeup of Congress.29
Between the post-1790 census and 1920, Congress considered,
and ultimately used, several different formulas.30 Each time, the
Members were acutely aware of the distributional consequences of
choosing one formula over the alternatives.31 Moreover, in every
decade prior to 1920, not only did Congress pick the apportionment
formula, but it also determined the number of seats to be appor-
tioned, changing that number each time.32 Perhaps predictably,
with the exception of the post-1840 apportionment, Congress con-
sistently increased the number of seats.33 And between 1870 and
29. See id. at 2.
30. For narrative accounts of the decennial reapportionments, see U.S. Dep’t of Commerce
v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 448-52 (1992); ANDERSON, supra note 12; BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra
note 12, at 7-56; and SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 12, at 107-24. The Census Bureau has
collected the decennial apportionment legislation on its website. See Apportionment
Legislation 1790-1830, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/
apportionment/ apportionment_legislation_1790_-_1830.html [https://perma.cc/7L6V-GVZ2]
(collecting apportionment legislation from 1790 to 1830); Apportionment Legislation 1840-
1880, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/apportionment/
apportionment_ legislation_1840_-_1880.html [https://perma.cc/EY2D-3GLQ] (collecting
apportionment legislation from 1840 to 1880); Apportionment Legislation 1890-Present, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/apportionment/apportion
ment_legislation_1890_-_present.html [https://perma.cc/FDU6-PXPX] (collecting apportion-
ment legislation since 1890).
31. See, e.g., BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 21, 35.
32. See Byron J. Harden, Note, House of the Rising Population: The Case for Eliminating
the 435-Member Limit on the U.S. House of Representatives, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 73, 78 & n.38
(2011); Comment, Apportionment of the House of Representatives, 58 YALE L.J. 1360, 1362
(1949); see also Charles A. Kromkowski & John A. Kromkowski, Commentary, Why 435? A
Question of Political Arithmetic, 24 POLITY 129, 132-33 (1991).
33. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 34-35. The first Congress, as part of the
package that became the Bill of Rights (as well as the far more recently ratified Twenty-
Seventh Amendment) also proposed an amendment—which, had it been ratified, would have
been the First Amendment—that would have provided additional direction regarding the size
of the House. S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97 (1789). (“[T]here shall be one representa-
tive for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred: after which,
the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hun-
dred representatives, nor less than one representative for every forty thousand persons, until
the number of representatives shall amount to two hundred, after which, the proportion shall
be so regulated by Congress that there shall not be less than two hundred representatives,
nor more than one representative for every fifty thousand persons.”).
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1920, it chose increases that interacted with the apportionment for-
mula to ensure that no state actually lost a seat.34
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution—the Elections Clause—
gives Congress the power to “make or alter” the “Manner of holding
Elections” for members of the House.35 Congress’s first major exer-
cise of this power came in 1842, when it required, after heated de-
bate involving both constitutional and policy-based arguments, that
states elect their representatives from single-member districts.36
With the move to single-member districts, the question arose as
to whether Congress should also provide direction on how districts
should be drawn.37 Initially, the Senate adopted a proviso “[t]hat
such districts shall be, as nearly as practicable, equal in the number
of their inhabitants.”38 Supporters of the proposal argued “that the
general principle was so clear and obvious, that no one could deny
its propriety”: equal representation required same-sized districts.39
And they warned that without such a requirement, each district
34. See EAGLES, supra note 12, at 28-30; Kromkowski & Kromkowski, supra note 32, at
136, 138 tbl.IV.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
36. See Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491 (providing that in every state
entitled to more than one representative, the representatives “shall be elected by districts
composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the number of Representatives to which
said State may be entitled, no one district electing more than one Representative”). This
requirement has been carried through in each successive apportionment. For discussions of
the motivations behind, and arguments over, the 1842 Act’s single-member district require-
ment, see ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMER-
ICAN DEMOCRACY 43-55 (2013); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1850, at 129-31 (1987); Martin H. Quitt, Congressional (Partisan)
Constitutionalism: The Apportionment Act Debates of 1842 and 1844, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC
627, 637-39, 641-42 (2008); and Johanna Nicol Shields, Whigs Reform the “Bear Garden”: Rep-
resentation and the Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 355, 359-63 (1985).
37. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 601-02 (1842).
38. Id. at 601. 
39. Id. at 610 (statement of Sen. Robert Walker (D-Miss.)). Prefiguring Chief Justice Earl
Warren’s insistence in Reynolds v. Sims that “[l]egislators represent people, not trees or
acres,” 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), Senator Walker contrasted the general consensus that
Congress could require the single-member districts to be composed of contiguous territory
with the disagreement over whether it could also require equal populations:
[G]entlemen were disposed to pay more respect to the dirt, and mud, and earth,
of which the counties were composed, than to human beings. All their attention
was directed to the geographical divisions, but no regard was paid to the
freemen that live and breathe upon the soil—no regard to population.
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 610 (1842).
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might “contain any number” of inhabitants, with states manipulat-
ing district boundaries so that two parties with equal numbers of
supporters might control very different numbers of districts.40
Almost immediately, however, strong opposition emerged. Some
of the opposition came from legislators who thought that, for what
we would see as values of federalism, states ought to decide how to
allocate their seats.41 Others pointed to the impossibility of drawing
equipopulous districts without splitting or joining political subdivi-
sions like counties and cities.42 Ultimately, the provision was de-
leted.43 The single-member districts had to be composed of geograph-
ically contiguous territory, but there were no other federal statutory
constraints on their configuration.44
Even without the imposition of the equal population constraint,
the decision to require districted elections had profound conse-
quences going forward.45 It meant the decline in one-party state del-
egations at the very moment when competitive two-party politics
was emerging.46 And by requiring every state to draw—and, if it re-
ceived additional seats after a new census, to redraw—its districts,47
the requirement for districted elections increased the opportunities
for gerrymandering, particularly given the lack of any statutory
constraint on district populations.48
40. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 601 (1842) (statement of Sen. Thomas Hart Benton
(D-Mo.)); see also id. at 608 (reiterating this risk during the debate over reconsideration).
41. See id. at 602 (statements of Sens. William Merrick (Whig-Md.) and Richard Bayard
(Whig-Del.)).
42. See id. (statement of Sen. Nathaniel Tallmadge (Whig-N.Y.)).
43. See id. (documenting only twenty-one senators voted in favor of the provision while
twenty-four voted against it).
44. See ENGSTROM, supra note 36, at 103.
45. Interestingly, in the immediate next election, four of the seven states that had been
electing their delegations at large—Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire—
ignored the new requirement and sent delegations made up completely of Democrats. See id.
at 54. The Whigs, who had pushed through the districting requirement, objected, but because
the Democrats now controlled the House, they seated all four delegations. Id. By 1846,
however, every state came into compliance. See id. at 55.
46. See id. at 44 (noting that by 1840, shifting factionalism in American politics had been
replaced with two national parties with “coherent and contrasting platforms”).
47. See id. at 46.
48. Indeed, as Robert Dixon observed, in several important senses, “[a]ll [d]istricting [i]s
‘[g]errymandering,’” because it usually alters—and is intended to alter—the results that
would occur if the election was conducted at large. See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 462 (1968).
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After the Civil War, apportionment changed again. The Thir-
teenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery would have automatical-
ly nullified the three-fifths clause of Article I, Section 2, because
there were no longer inhabitants of the United States who were not
“free Persons.”49 But the Fourteenth Amendment drove home that
point, providing that “Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed.”50
The Reconstruction Congress was, however, concerned that
southern states would nonetheless continue to disenfranchise Black
people51—in which case, emancipation would actually increase the
bonus they received on account of their Black inhabitants.52 Con-
gress wrestled with the idea of changing the apportionment base
from population to number of voters to avoid this problem.53 But
there was strong opposition from New England, both because it “had
a disproportionately large number of women (who were universally
excluded from voting at the time) due to an extensive emigration of
her males to the West”54 and because many of its states imposed
more restrictions on the franchise than some of the newer states.55
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
50. Id. amend. XIV, § 2. For discussions of Section 2, see Michael Kent Curtis, The
Fourteenth Amendment: Recalling What the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 955-61
(2008); Gregory E. Maggs, A Critical Guide to Using the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment to Determine the Amendment’s Original Meaning, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1069, 1087-90
(2017); Earl M. Maltz, The Forgotten Provision of the Fourteenth Amendment: Section 2 and
the Evolution of American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 149 (2015); and Franita Tolson, What
Is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 445-59 (2015). For a
detailed account of Section 2’s legislative history, see George David Zuckerman, A Con-
sideration of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30
FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (1961).
51. See Maggs, supra note 50, at 1084, 1087.
52. See Zuckerman, supra note 50, at 110.
53. See id. at 100, 105.
54. Id. at 95. George Zuckerman reprinted a chart of all the forms of disenfranchisement
of male, adult citizens that existed in the several states as of 1869, presented during the
congressional debate over apportionment following the upcoming census. Id. at 108.
55. See id. at 95. As part of the 1870 census, the enumerators were asked to provide
statistics about the levels of adult male disenfranchisement in the states. ANDERSON, supra
note 12, at 79-80. The statistics look like absolute garbage overall. See id. at 80; Zuckerman,
supra note 50, at 110-12. And they were compiled before the Fifteenth Amendment, which
forbid disenfranchisement on the basis of race, went into effect. See Zuckerman, supra note
50, at 110. Nonetheless, it may be telling that Rhode Island was reported to have the highest
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Ultimately, Congress settled instead on including in the Four-
teenth Amendment a reduction-of-representation clause.56 That
clause provided that when a state “denied” any male adult citizen
the right to vote—“or in any way abridged” that right “except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime”—the state’s “basis of rep-
resentation” would be “reduced in the proportion which the number
of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.”57
It was against this backdrop of constitutional changes to appor-
tionment, compounded by profound demographic shifts, that Con-
gress took up the first post-Civil War apportionment. In the 1872
Apportionment Act,58 Congress monkeyed quite a bit with the num-
bers, giving several states additional seats to which the apportion-
ment formula did not entitle them.59 The Act repeated, but without
any enforcement mechanism, the reduction of representation re-
quirement from the Fourteenth Amendment.60
The 1872 Act also included, for the first time, a requirement
that the districts drawn in states entitled to more than one seat
“contain[ ] as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabit-
ants.”61 This was one person, one vote avant la lettre.
overall rate—apparently due to its requirement that electors own a certain value of realty.
See id. at 112. After 1870, the census never again included questions designed to determine
rates of disenfranchisement. See ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 81.
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
57. Id.
58. Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28. 
59. See ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 80; BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 37 (stating
that “[i]n the ... 1870s no real method was used” and instead the results of the conventional
formula “were altered to satisfy the greed of certain states”).
60. Act of Feb. 2, 1872 § 6. For a valuable, recent discussion of the background to the 1872
Act, see Gerard N. Magliocca, Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 23-30), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3017614 [https://perma.cc/BF5Z-WGH6]. Professor Magliocca also argues that
the current apportionment statute is unconstitutional, because it makes no provision for de-
termining the level of disenfranchisement and then applying the reduction-of-representation
penalty. See id. (manuscript at 59).
61. See Act of Feb. 2, 1872 § 2. Section 2 of the 1872 Act also provided that if a state
gained seats and did not draw a sufficient number of districts, the additional seats would be
elected at large. See id. Prior to the 1872 Act, if a state was awarded additional seats, it would
forfeit those seats if it did not redraw its districts, because all representatives were required
to be elected from districts and no district could elect more than one representative. See
ENGSTROM, supra note 36, at 64. This part of section 2 had several perhaps unintended
consequences. First, it eliminated a powerful disincentive against refusals to redistrict,
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The requirement was proposed by Representative James H. Platt,
Jr., a Republican from Virginia, who had settled there after serving
as a lieutenant colonel in the Union Army during the Civil War.62
His argument echoed points made during the debate over the 1842
Act, although neither he nor anyone else seemed aware of the ear-
lier proposal:
[N]othing [would] prevent a State, if it chooses to do so, from
making half a State one congressional district and dividing the
rest of the State among the other members. They can make one
district containing any population they choose, and other
districts with as small a population as they choose.63
Perhaps surprisingly—for example, during the same session, mem-
bers of Congress debated at some length whether to set a uniform
national election day64—this significant change “provoked no dis-
cussion or dissension in either Congress or the press.”65
As with the reduction-of-representation provision contained in
the 1872 Act, there was no express enforcement mechanism for the
equal inhabitants requirement.66 Still, the requirement seems to
because a state would no longer lose seats. See id. at 72. Second, it allowed for the strategic
and partisan use of at-large seats. See id. at 74. 
62. PLATT, James Henry, Jr., (1837-1894), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=P000380 [https://perma.cc/22QE-
JRQD].
63. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1871).
64. See id. at 137-38.
65. See PETER H. ARGERSINGER, REPRESENTATION AND INEQUALITY IN LATE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF APPORTIONMENT 14 (2012). Having written that there
was no discussion, Professor Argersinger immediately, and somewhat confusingly, claimed
that the requirement “was seen not as an innovation but as an explicit statement of a ‘just’
principle and in accord with contemporary decisions on equal (male) suffrage and free
elections” without identifying who was doing the seeing. See id. I have been unable to find any
discussion in the scholarly literature as to why this provision was added. Zuckerman’s account
of the 1869-72 debates over apportionment is quite extensive but never addresses this issue.
See generally Zuckerman, supra note 50. Nor do any of the more general accounts of reappor-
tionment provided by the sources cited previously in note 12. Anthony McGann and his
colleagues suggest, by negative implication, some connection to Reconstruction. See ANTHONY
J. MCGANN ET AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE FUTURE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 184 (2016) (stating with respect
to Congress’s imposition of the equal population requirement in 1872, “Reconstruction ended
soon after, and this was never enforced”).
66. See generally Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11.
1934 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1921
have at least some hortatory effect: the average population devia-
tion among districts “dipped to around 7 percent between 1872 and
1900,” from over 10 percent in 1842.67 
The 1911 Apportionment Act marked the culmination of the first
period of federal reapportionment legislation and its features are
fairly representative of congressional approaches up to that point.
Congress decided to create a House with 433 members, because that
was the smallest number it could use that would not reduce the size
of any state’s delegation.68 It also provided that the number would
increase to 435 if New Mexico and Arizona became states within the
decade, giving each new state a single representative.69 It chose to
apportion the seats using the “[m]ethod of [m]ajor [f]ractions” re-
cently proposed by Walter F. Willcox, a professor of economics and
statistics at Cornell,70 a method designed to “secure[ ] approximate
equality of representation per million inhabitants” measured in
absolute terms71 that mildly advantaged larger states over smaller
ones.72 And in keeping with provisions it had included since the
post-1870 apportionment, it required “[t]hat in each State entitled
... to more than one [seat], the Representatives to the [next Con-
gress] and each subsequent Congress shall be elected by districts
composed of a contiguous and compact territory, and containing as
nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.”73
67. ENGSTROM, supra note 36, at 154. That number shot up to over 20 percent in 1932 and
1942, after the Supreme Court relieved states of any obligation to comply with equal
population principles. See Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932); ENGSTROM, supra note 36, at
154.
68. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 47.
69. See Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 2, 37 Stat. 13, 14.
70. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Congressional Reapportionment, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1015,
1028, 1035-38 (1929). Willcox’s method of major fractions resembles the method proposed by
Daniel Webster and used in the post-1840 apportionment. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v.
Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 450-51 (1992). See generally PAT HUNLEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STA-
TISTICS 2014-04, PROOF OF EQUIVALENCE OF WEBSTER’S METHOD AND WILLCOX’S METHOD OF
MAJOR FRACTIONS (2014), https://www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdf/RRS2014-04.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G6SB-HNTP]. For accessible explanations of the different methods, see SCHMECK-
EBIER, supra note 12, at 12-58; and Congressional Apportionment: Historical Perspective, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/history.html [https:
//perma.cc/3S4F-NDQU]. For accounts of the emergence of social scientific and statistical
study of apportionment methods and the roles of Willcox, Edward V. Huntington, and Joseph
A. Hill, see BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 46-50; and EAGLES, supra note 12, at 42-45.
71. Chafee, supra note 70, at 1036.
72. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 152.
73. Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 3. For prior versions of the equipopulousity requirement,
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II. THE STALEMATE OF THE 1920S
The United States of 1920, like the United States of today, was a
nation characterized by unease and polarization. Americans lacked
“their former confidence in democracy or religion.”74 There was deep
distrust between the growing and increasingly cosmopolitan cities
and declining small towns in the Midwest and the South.75 Walter
Lippman described a tension between “the new urban civilization
with its irresistible economic and scientific and mass power” and
“the older American village civilization making its last stand
against what to it looks like an alien invasion.”76 Traditionalists per-
ceived a threat “from enclaves of the foreign-born, not yet adapted
to American ways,”77 immigrants who seemed racially different from
their predecessors.78 The urban-rural tensions played out in sub-
stantive differences over everything from morals legislation—most
notably Prohibition—to tax and trade policy.79
The census of 1920 gave concrete proof of these perceptions. For
the first time, a majority of the American population lived in urban
places.80 Not only that: the urban population had grown by nineteen
million people during the decade, while the rural population had
actually shrunk by five million.81 For the first time, the census
see Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734; Act of Feb. 7, 1891, ch. 16, § 3, 26 Stat.
735, 735; Act of Feb. 25, 1882, ch. 20, § 3, 22 Stat. 5, 6; and Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 2, 17
Stat. 28, 28.
74. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-1932, at 203 (2d ed.
1993).
75. See EAGLES, supra note 12, at 3-4.
76. Id. at 4-5 (quoting WALTER LIPPMAN, MEN OF DESTINY 28 (Transaction Publishers
2003) (1927)); see also Ronald Brownstein, How the Election Revealed the Divide Between City
and Country, ATLANTIC (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/
clinton-trump-city-country-divide/507902/ [https://perma.cc/4WED-JMDE] (comparing the
political landscape as we approach 2020 to the landscape of 1920).
77. LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 74, at 203.
78. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 137.
79. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 51-52 (citing 70 CONG. REC. 9087 (1928) (speech
of Rep. Emmanuel Celler (D-N.Y.))).
80. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 134. Note that this included what we would now think
of as small towns of anything over 2500 inhabitants. Id.
81. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 51.
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published “complete returns on citizenship of the foreign born,” and
they showed a rapidly changing America.82
When Congress turned to reapportionment, it found that the
huge swings in population produced by both immigration and in-
ternal migration during World War I meant that the size of the
House would have to swell from 435 to 483 to avoid taking seats
away from at least one state.83 If the House size remained at 435,
roughly a dozen states were likely to lose seats, and political power
would transfer to large, urban, northeastern states and away from
states in the Midwest and South.84 Population shifts also threatened
continued Republican control over Congress.85 Further, with the
admission of New Mexico and Arizona, there was no longer the
possibility of creating additional western states in the continental
United States to counterbalance the eastern population.86
At the same time, there was strong opposition to such a massive
increase; the New Republic, for example, charged that the House
“functions badly enough” at the current size and “did not need more
members to add ‘their oratory to the legislative babel.’”87
The demographic realities might have been sufficient on their
own to produce a stalemate, but they were further complicated by
arguments about the representational base. Civil rights leaders and
maverick Massachusetts Representative George Holden Tinkham
sought an inquiry into Black disenfranchisement in the South.88
They pressed the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
reduction-of-representation clause should come into play to reduce
southern states’ representation in the House.89 By 1920, the South
had completed the project of essentially disenfranchising its Black
82. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 12, at 87.
83. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 50-51; EAGLES, supra note 12, at 33-34.
84. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 51; EAGLES, supra note 12, at 33.
85. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 138-39.
86. Id.
87. EAGLES, supra note 12, at 33 (quoting NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 1920, at 177).
88. Id. at 34. I knew nothing about Tinkham before I began the research for this Article,
but he is surely one of the quirkiest individuals ever to serve in public office. For a profile of
this never-campaigning Boston Brahmin whose “favorite attitude” was “[o]pposition” and who
was “so strong ... that plaster casts of his arms, shoulders, and back were sent to Chicago in
1893 to be exhibited” at the World’s Fair, see Will Lang, Tinkham the Mighty Hunter: Boston’s
Congressman Bags Votes Like Tigers but Never Campaigns, LIFE, Dec. 16, 1940, at 69,
http://tinyurl.com/Tinkham [https://perma.cc/496C-GJ3F].
89. EAGLES, supra note 12, at 34; see also Magliocca, supra note 60 (manuscript at 31-34).
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population.90 The ensuing disparities in voting rates were stagger-
ing. During debates in the House, a representative from West Vir-
ginia—then, as now, an overwhelmingly white state91—pointed out
that in his district, eighty-five thousand votes had been cast in the
1920 election; he contrasted that number with the statewide totals
in South Carolina and Mississippi—the two states with the highest
proportion of Black residents.92 In the former, only sixty-eight
thousand votes had been cast statewide for all seven of South
Carolina’s seats combined; in the latter, seventy-one thousand votes
had been spread among eight seats.93
Southern representatives responded with bald-faced denials and
racist comments.94 But they, joined by representatives from pre-
dominantly rural states that were at risk of losing seats, also ar-
gued for their own change to the representational base: excluding
noncitizens.95 Their arguments contain echoes of contemporary
debates over immigration. Representative Edward C. Little from
Kansas expressed concern that reapportionment would “turn this
government over to the cities where ignorance, poverty, vice, and
crime are staring you in the face.”96 He argued that “[i]t is not best
for America that her councils be dominated by semicivilized foreign
colonies in Boston, New York, Chicago.”97 His compatriot Hays B.
90. See Tolson, supra note 50, at 466.
91. Compare Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population
Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other
Urban Places in the United States tbl.49 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 76, 2005),
https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/twps0076.html [https://
perma.cc/VNB9-6ETR], with QuickFacts: West Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/WV [https://perma.cc/DPB2-JTKY] (statistics through July 1, 2016).
92. See EAGLES, supra note 12, at 47.
93. Id. Similarly, fewer votes had been cast in eleven southern states combined than in
Illinois, but with apportionment based on total population, those states had been given five
times the number of seats that Illinois had. Id. at 34.
A generation later, the numbers were equally striking. As of 1938, nationwide the votes
cast for representatives expressed as a percentage of the population was 29.6, but only 6.8 for
the southern states. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 12, at 91. It took 35,439 votes to elect Mis-
sissippi’s seven representatives, but 730,024 votes to elect Kansas’s seven representatives.
Id. And in 1954, the year of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in thirteen
majority-Black counties in Mississippi, only fourteen Black voters total cast ballots. Zucker-
man, supra note 50, at 124.
94. See EAGLES, supra note 12, at 47-48.
95. See ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 151, 156.
96. EAGLES, supra note 12, at 38 (quoting 60 CONG. REC. 1648 (1921)).
97. Id.
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White “claimed that counting 1 million aliens who ‘are probably
technically subject to deportation ... might vitiate the morality of the
apportionment.’”98 Senator James Thomas Heflin of Alabama called
aliens “crooks, criminals, kidnappers, bandits, terrorists, racketeers,
and ‘refuse of foreign countries’ and claimed that most came to the
United States illegally” and therefore should not be included in the
representational base.99 His colleague Hugo Black—who later be-
came a champion of one person, one vote, writing the opinion for the
Court in Wesberry v. Sanders that required Georgia to redraw its
congressional districts100—“denied that the Constitution required
reapportionment every ten years”101 and also “demanded ‘an enu-
meration of aliens lawfully in the United States and aliens unlaw-
fully in the United States.’”102
After the initial failure to reapportion, the House took no action
between 1921 and 1925 on reallocating seats among the states. In
1926, the Chairman of the House Committee on the Census, Repre-
sentative Hart Fenn from Connecticut, essentially gave up on the
prospect of achieving a reapportionment based on the 1920 census
and turned instead to the idea of a permanent, prospective reap-
portionment bill before the 1930 census.103 Senator Arthur Vanden-
berg from Michigan pressed the idea as well, and in 1929, Congress
adopted a prospective apportionment bill to govern the post-1930
apportionment and any future apportionment should Congress
“fail[ ] to enact a law apportioning Representatives among the sev-
eral States.”104
The Reapportionment and Census Act of 1929 delegated to the
President the duty of informing Congress of “the number of Rep-
resentatives to which each State would be entitled under an appor-
tionment of the then existing number of Representatives made.”105
The Act directed the President to calculate this number by refer-
ence to potentially three different formulas: “the method used in the
98. Id. at 61.
99. Id. at 77 (quoting 71 CONG. REC. 2054 (1929)).
100. 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 18 (1964).
101. EAGLES, supra note 12, at 76.
102. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 57 (quoting 71 CONG. REC. 2078 (1929)).
103. See ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 153-55.
104. Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 22(b), 46 Stat. 21, 26-27.
105. Id. § 22(a). By contrast, in earlier apportionment bills, the number of seats allocated
to each state was expressly laid out. See Harden, supra note 32, at 78 & n.38.
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last preceding apportionment,”106 “the method known as the method
of major fractions,”107 and “the method known as the method of
equal proportions.”108 Unless Congress agreed otherwise, the seats
would then be allocated using “the method used in the last preced-
ing apportionment.”109
Toward the end of the process of adopting the permanent reappor-
tionment bill, there were a number of compromises. Proposals for
excluding either disenfranchised citizens or aliens from the repre-
sentational base were defeated.110 And Representative Fenn made
one change that was to have a major impact on American politics.
He omitted the requirement, brought forward from the 1911 Appor-
tionment Act, that “districts ‘be composed of contiguous and compact
territory and contain as nearly as practicable the same number of
individuals.’”111
It is not entirely clear why the equal-population requirement was
deleted. There was virtually no debate on the floor and no comment
from the press.112
106. Act of June 18, 1929 § 22(a)(1).
107. Id. § 22(a)(2). This was also the method used in the last apportionment. See supra text
accompanying notes 69-73.
108. Act of June 18, 1929 § 22(a)(3).
109. Id. § 22(b). Because the 1911 apportionment had used the method of major fractions,
see supra note 71 and accompanying text, the President reported two calculations to Congress
in 1931. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 57. Fortuitously, those calculations resulted
in identical allocations of seats that time. See id. In 1941, however, the two methods produced
different apportionments with respect to one seat. See id. at 57, 58 tbl.6.3. Unsurprisingly, a
Congress controlled by Democrats chose to use the method of equal proportions, which gave
the final seat to overwhelmingly Democratic Arkansas rather than predominantly Republican
Michigan, and it amended the 1929 Act to make the method of equal proportions the sole
method of calculating the apportionment. See id. at 58; see also Act of Nov. 15, 1941, ch. 470,
§ 22(a), 55 Stat. 761, 761-62 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012)); Mark M. Bell,
Student Article, Webster Plus One: Solving the “Impossible” Apportionment Debate, 36 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 139, 151 (2010) (describing the 1941 process).
110. See EAGLES, supra note 12, at 80.
111. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 155.
112. See EAGLES, supra note 12, at 72. The Supreme Court was later to claim “that the
omission was deliberate” and made “after debate.” Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932). I
checked all the pages of the Congressional Record cited by the Court. On most of them, I found
nothing about the equal-population requirement. I found only one statement made on the floor
directly addressing why the requirement should be removed. Representative Ralph Lozier (D-
Mo.) stated that the requirement, along with directives about how states should handle the
election of an increased or decreased number of representatives until they completed a new
redistricting, was “violative of the letter and spirit of constitutional mandate.” 70 CONG. REC.
1496 (1929). He asserted that:
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Professor Margo Anderson, a scholar of the census, has suggest-
ed that Congress’s focus was on apportionment, rather than dis-
tricting: 
Some congressmen felt that the language was extraneous. Oth-
ers argued that the language from old reapportionment bills not
specifically repealed by the current bill would remain in force
and thus that there was no need to repeat the language. Overall,
passage of a viable reapportionment bill was the only question
at hand. Districting seemed relatively unimportant.113
But Professor Charles W. Eagles, who has written the most detailed
history of the post-1920 nonapportionment, has hypothesized that
the deletion may have been the product of a backroom deal to per-
mit rural members to preserve their seats, even if their districts
were losing population.114
In any event, the precommitment strategy worked, and the post-
1930 apportionment proceeded uneventfully—at least as a proce-
dural matter.115 As a substantive matter, it saw a massive shift in
political power. California’s delegation shot from eleven members to
twenty; meanwhile, twenty-one states lost seats.116 And in 1941,
Congress revised the permanent apportionment bill to provide that
seats would be allocated using the method of equal proportions.117
The modern statutory process for reapportionment was thereby
The only power that Congress is given by the Constitution with reference to
apportionment of Representatives is to apportion the representation among the
several States in proportion to the numbers or population. That duty done, the
power of Congress ends, and Congress has no power to determine in what man-
ner the several States exercise their sovereign rights in selecting their Repre-
sentatives in Congress .... [N]o man who has even a speaking acquaintance with
the Constitution will get on this floor and defend the provisions.
Id.
113. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 155.
114. See EAGLES, supra note 12, at 72-73.
115. See id. at 73.
116. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 157.
117. See Act of Nov. 15, 1941, ch. 470, § 1, 55 Stat. 761, 761-62 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012)).
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settled and has remained essentially the same for the past seventy-
five years,118 even as the processes of redistricting have undergone
a series of revolutions.
III. THE IRONY OF 1929
Perhaps not surprisingly, given that they were responding (or
refusing to respond) to twenty years of profound demographic and
cultural change, the congressional districting plans states drew
following the 1931 reapportionment prompted litigation. Ironically,
although lower courts struck down a number of plans with gross
population disparities, the Supreme Court read the Apportionment
Act of 1929 to permit the very entrenchment within states that the
Act counteracted among them.
The lead case before the Court came from Mississippi. As a result
of the 1930 census, Mississippi’s congressional delegation shrank
from eight to seven members.119 “In 1932, after long and acrimoni-
ous battle, it appeared that the Legislature would never agree on
any redistricting plan” but “[a]t the last minute, the matter was
settled by combining the Seventh and Eighth Districts.”120
It would have been possible to apportion Mississippi into seven
districts “having approximately the same number of inhabitants.”121
But the total populations of the new districts varied dramatically.
There were fewer than two hundred thousand people in the Fourth
Congressional District but roughly four hundred thousand people in
118. The current version of the apportionment statute, see 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012), is
essentially similar to the 1941 version with respect to how seats are allocated.
119. See Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 4 (1932).
120. Connor v. Johnson, 279 F. Supp. 619, 620 (S.D. Miss. 1966) (three-judge court) (per
curiam), aff’d, 386 U.S. 483 (1967); see also Wood v. State, 142 So. 747, 761 (Miss. 1932) (Cook,
J., dissenting) (charging that “there [had been] no real attempt on the part of the Legislature
to redistrict the entire state, but rather it merely combined two of the then existing districts
lying in the south central and southwestern part of the state into one, leaving the remaining
districts practically as they were from 1912 to 1932”).
Mississippi adopted the same tactic in its post-1960 congressional redistricting. As a result
of the census, Mississippi went from six districts to five. The State simply combined the
preexisting Second and Third Congressional Districts, leaving the other districts untouched.
FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965,
at 43, 44 map 2.2, 45 map 2.3 (1990).
121. Broom v. Wood, 1 F. Supp. 134, 135 (S.D. Miss. 1932) (three-judge court), rev’d, 287
U.S. 1 (1932).
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the Third,122 a district centered on the overwhelmingly Black
Delta.123
A voter who lived in the significantly overpopulated Seventh Dis-
trict, Stewart C. Broom, brought suit. He claimed that the popula-
tion disparities violated section 3 of the Apportionment Act of 1911.
He did not claim directly that the Constitution required equality of
population among districts. Relying on the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Smiley v. Holm, which had held that in a state that lost
House seats, “unless and until new districts are created, all repre-
sentatives allotted to the State must be elected by the State at
122. Id. 
123. See PARKER, supra note 120, at 43, 44 map 2.2.
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large,”124 he sought injunctive relief against use of the new districts
in the upcoming election.
The district court agreed. It held that the constraints on dis-
tricting contained in the 1911 Act were “mandatory and must be
followed by the states in fixing congressional districts.”125 Because
Mississippi’s congressional map was “clearly violative” of the Act,
the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.126
124. 285 U.S. 355, 374-75 (1932). Smiley involved a challenge to the post-1930 con-
gressional redistricting in Minnesota, another state that had lost a seat. See id. at 361-62. For
a discussion of the fascinating background to the case, see Benedict J. Schweigert, Note, “Now
For a Clean Sweep!”: Smiley v. Holm, Partisan Gerrymandering, and At-Large Congressional
Elections, 107 MICH. L. REV. 133, 141-49 (2008). Republicans controlled the state legislature,
but the governorship was held by a member of the more progressive Farmer-Labor Party. See
id. at 141-42. The legislature enacted a gerrymandered plan designed to insulate the state’s
incumbent Republican congressmen by packing Farmer-Labor supporters into a single,
dramatically overpopulated district. See id. at 146. When the governor vetoed the bill, Re-
publicans argued that the veto was ineffective because the Constitution conferred the power
to prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for ... Representatives” on
“the Legislature” of the state, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, c.1, giving no role to the governor. See
Schweigert, supra, at 148-49.
The Supreme Court disagreed unanimously, holding that redistricting was ordinary leg-
islation, and that if the state’s ordinary legislative process provided for a gubernatorial veto—
as Minnesota’s did—then that veto would be effective. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 371-75. The
Court then found that Minnesota therefore had no districting plan in place, the governor
having vetoed the new nine-seat plan and the prior ten-seat plan being “not at all adapted to
the new apportionment.” See id. at 374-75. Accordingly, the only way to conduct elections was
at large. See id. Because there was no districting plan, “[q]uestions in relation to the appli-
cation of the standards defined in section 3 of the Act of 1911 to a redistricting statute, if such
a statute should hereafter be enacted, [were] wholly abstract,” id. at 375, and the Court did
not therefore answer the question “whether the Act of Congress of August 8, 1911, [was] still
in force,” id. at 373.
Minnesota was not the only state that ended up electing members of the House at large
after the 1931 reapportionment. Missouri lost three seats in the apportionment, and after the
governor vetoed a new redistricting bill, the state supreme court held that the State was re-
quired to elect its delegation at large. See State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker, 45 S.W.2d 533, 533-
35 (Mo.), aff’d sub nom. Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932). And after New York gained
two seats, the state legislature tried to redraw the map through concurrent resolutions, rather
than through ordinary legislation submitted to the governor. See Koenig v. Flynn, 179 N.E.
705, 706 (N.Y.), aff’d, 285 U.S. 375 (1932). The state’s highest court rejected the attempt, and
held that forty-three of the forty-five Congressmen were “to be elected according to the
districts created” by New York’s 1911 redistricting statute with the other two being “elected
at large by the entire state.” Id. at 708. The Supreme Court affirmed both decisions on the
strength of Smiley. See Carroll, 285 U.S. at 382; Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375, 379 (1932).
125. Broom, 1 F. Supp. at 135.
126. Id. at 135-36.
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The post-1930 congressional redistricting in Kentucky followed a
similar path.127 Kentucky’s allocation had gone from eleven seats to
nine—a particularly sharp drop.128 Given the State’s total popula-
tion, equipopulous districts would have had roughly 290,000 in-
habitants each.129 The State decided to put all of Jefferson County
(Louisville) in a single district despite its population of 355,000
people, which was more than enough for a single district but not
nearly enough to constitute two full districts.130 There were 119
remaining counties, only five of which had populations over 60,000,
with the average county having a population of 19,000.131
A three-judge district court found that:
In view of this situation, the Legislature was confronted with
no difficulty whatever in dividing these one hundred and nine-
teen counties into eight congressional districts of substantially
equal population, and this without the necessity of dividing any
county; and the topography of the state presents no obstacle to
carving these districts out of contiguous and compact territory.132
Indeed, the plaintiffs presented a map showing eight districts, each
composed of contiguous whole counties, with population differences
of less than 4000 between the most populous and the least.133 But
the State instead created adjacent districts with population dispa-
rities of up to 114,000 inhabitants.134
The district court had no trouble concluding that Kentucky’s
redistricting violated section 3 of the 1911 Apportionment Act.135
Given “practical considerations against throwing a part of this coun-
ty into another congressional district,”136 it thought the legislature’s
decision to put all of Jefferson County in a single, overpopulated
district should not “be regarded as a violation of the spirit of the
127. The facts here are taken from Hume v. Mahan, 1 F. Supp. 142, 149-50 (E.D. Ky.),
rev’d, 287 U.S. 575 (1932).
128. See id. at 149.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 149-50.
132. Id. at 150.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 150-51.
136. Id. at 149.
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federal act.”137 What it could not countenance was what the legis-
lature did with the rest of the state.138 Not only had the legislature
drawn districts with dramatically different populations, but it had
also drawn ones that “outrageously violate[d] the requirement of
compactness of territory.”139 Comparing the Fifth District to “a
French style telephone,” with some counties “strung along the river
forming the handle” and still others “forming the mouthpiece and
receiver respectively,” the court concluded that “a visual examina-
tion of the outlines upon the map” was “sufficient to repel any pre-
sumption of a good-faith attempt on the part of the Legislature to
comply with section 3 of the Act of August 8, 1911.”140 As a result,
the court declared the entire redistricting act invalid.141
And yet, when the issue whether states were required to pursue
population equality among districts reached the Supreme Court, in
the poetically captioned Wood v. Broom, the Supreme Court upheld
the Mississippi map.142 Answering the question left open in Smiley,
the Court declared that because the 1911 Act’s insistence on equal
population requirements had been omitted from the Reapportion-
ment Act of 1929, the requirement “did not outlast the apportion-
ment to which [it] related.”143 Based on its decision in Wood v.
137. Id. When the Supreme Court ultimately imposed equipopulousity as a constitutional
requirement, it treated political subdivision boundaries differently with respect to congres-
sional districts and state legislative districts. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321, modi-
fied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973). With respect to state legislative district boundaries, the Court has
generally permitted total population deviations of up to 10 percent, in part to permit states
to take local political subdivision boundaries into account in drawing districts. See id. at 320-
22. By contrast, the Court has generally required states to achieve the maximum “practicable”
equality with respect to congressional districts. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964);
see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728, 739-40 (1983) (holding that a plan with a total pop-
ulation deviation of 0.6984 percent did not meet this standard because it would have been
possible to craft a plan with a smaller deviation). More recently, the Court upheld a West Vir-
ginia congressional redistricting plan where the deviation was 0.79 percent, in part because
the plan was designed to avoid splitting the state’s counties. See Tennant v. Jefferson Cty.
Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 764 (2012) (per curiam).
138. See Hume, 1 F. Supp. at 150-51.
139. Id. at 150.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 150-51.
142. 287 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1932).
143. See id. at 8. As I suggested earlier, the Court’s assertion that the “legislative history
[of the 1929 Act] shows that the omission was deliberate” and made “after debate,” id. at 7,
exaggerates a bit. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. To be sure, the omission was
deliberate, in the sense that Representative Fenn made a motion to strike out the section of
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Broom, the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decree in the
Kentucky case as well, directing the court to dismiss the com-
plaint.144
The Supreme Court’s brief opinion in Wood v. Broom—issued just
five days after oral argument145—did not advert to a striking
passage in Mississippi’s brief defending the post-1930 map. In
addition to arguing that the plaintiff ’s claim was nonjusticiable
because control over congressional districting was confided to Con-
gress and the state legislatures, the State argued that the plan in
fact achieved approximate equality “as to number of qualified
electors.”146 And how were those electors described? As “native
whites.”147 By 1932, Mississippi had effectively disenfranchised its
the bill containing the requirement, and that proposed amendment was agreed to. See 70
CONG. REC. 1604 (1929). But there was virtually no debate on this particular decision. See
EAGLES, supra note 12, at 72.
Broom argued, relying on the Court’s reservation of the question in Smiley v. Holm, that
“the standards defined in section 3 of the act of 1911” were still in force. 285 U.S. 355, 373,
375 (1932); see also Brief for Appellee at 21-22, Wood, 287 U.S. 1 (No. 424). He asserted that
because nothing in the 1929 Act “conflict[ed] with Section 3” that provision should not be seen
as having been expressly or impliedly repealed. Brief for Appellee, supra, at 21-22, 25.
Broom’s brief contains a touchingly apologetic conclusion in which his counsel states that the
brief “does not measure up to our ideas of what a brief should be and contain” because of the
“necessary haste involved in its preparation.” Id. at 36. And haste there indeed was: the entire
proceeding in the Supreme Court took less than a month, see Wood, 287 U.S. at 1, and
Broom’s attorneys had to write their brief without seeing the appellant’s brief first. See Brief
for Appellee, supra, at 3. In general, “repeals by implication are not favored.” Posadas v. Nat’l
City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). The Supreme Court long ago held that 
when an affirmative statute contains no expression of a purpose to repeal a prior
law, it does not repeal it unless the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, or
unless the later statute covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is
clearly intended as a substitute for it, and the intention of the legislature to
repeal must be clear and manifest.
Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 601-02 (1883). Clearly, the 1929 Act replaced the actual
apportionment of representatives in the 1911 Act. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 373. But it would
have been entirely possible to continue giving effect to the sections of the 1911 Act—like the
equipopulousity requirement in section 3 or the requirement in section 4 that states continue
to use the existing districts until new districts were drawn and elect any additional repre-
sentatives at large—that did not directly allocate seats. See Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, §§ 3-4,
37 Stat. 13, 14. Nothing about the 1929 Act therefore required the Court to hold that section
3 of the 1911 Act had been repealed. See, e.g., Smiley, 285 U.S. at 373.
144. Mahan v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575, 576 (1932) (per curiam).
145. See Wood, 287 U.S. at 1.
146. See Brief for Appellants at 130, Wood, 287 U.S. 1 (No. 424).
147. Id.
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Black population.148 So although the Third Congressional District,
located in the Mississippi Delta, had a disproportionately large total
population, it had relatively few voters.149 The Supreme Court com-
pletely ignored the racial dynamics behind the Mississippi map.
Wood v. Broom effectively took federal courts out of the business of
policing congressional district boundaries.150 And given the difficul-
ties Congress had had in reaching any kind of agreement on ap-
portionment, the decision also effectively took Congress out of the
business as well. Over the next several decades, the degree of pop-
ulation imbalance among districts within a state increased.151 The
growing inequality among districts—and the demographic trans-
formation of the United States during and after World War II into
a suburban nation—meant there was little likelihood that Congress
would restore an equal-population requirement that would result in
members losing their seats.152
The post-1930 congressional redistricting fared differently in
state courts. Virginia’s constitutions had had requirements for equi-
populous congressional districts for more than a century, antedating
both the federal requirements for districted elections and the federal
directives about the configuration of districts. The Constitution of
1830 had required that Virginia’s seats “be apportioned as nearly as
may be amongst the several counties, cities, boroughs, and towns of
the State, according to their respective numbers.”153 That provision
148. See Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896) (“Within the field of permissible
action under the limitations imposed by the federal constitution, [Mississippi’s Constitutional
Convention of 1890] swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by
the negro race.”). Mississippi did so through a series of laws—later revised to make them even
more discriminatory—involving literacy tests, durational residency requirements, criminal
disenfranchisement provisions, and poll taxes. See PARKER, supra note 120, at 27. As late as
1964, only 6.4 percent of Black adults in Mississippi were registered to vote. South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966).
149. See SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 12, at 92. The Third Congressional District contained
almost a third of the state’s Black population and had 46 percent more residents than the
average Mississippi congressional district. See id. In 1938, only 2172 voters cast ballots, even
though there were 55,571 whites of voting age and 168,452 Blacks of voting age within the
district. Id.
150. See, e.g., Mahan v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575, 576 (1932) (per curiam) (dismissing the case
on the grounds of Woods v. Broom).
151. See ENGSTROM, supra note 36, at 154 fig.8.3 (providing deviation figures by decade).
152. See id. at 152 fig.8.1, 153 fig.8.2, 154 fig.8.3, 167-70; see also ANDERSON, supra note
12, at 157.
153. See Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 109 (Va. 1932) (quoting VA. CONST. of 1830 art.
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was carried forward into the Commonwealth’s subsequent constitu-
tions. The version in the Constitution of 1902 mirrored the require-
ment in the 1911 Federal Apportionment Act: congressional districts
were to be “composed of contiguous and compact territory, contain-
ing as near as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.”154 The
Commonwealth’s post-1860, post-1870, and post-1880 maps were
striking for their degree of population equality, particularly given
Virginia’s “unbroken custom to refrain from dividing any county or
city into separate districts.”155
Like Mississippi, Virginia lost one of its congressional seats fol-
lowing the 1930 census. And like Mississippi, it responded not by re-
drawing its entire map, but essentially through a “compromise” that
combined two of the preexisting districts to create a district that
was “the largest in the State and by far the most unwieldy politi-
cally.”156 The upshot was a plan where the largest district was more
than 67,000 people above the ideal district size of “269,092-1/9,”157
and the smallest was more than 85,000 people below.
Several Republican candidates challenged the plan as violative of
both section 3 of the 1911 Reapportionment Act and section 55 of
the Virginia Constitution. Recognizing that there were “divergent
views” among other state and federal courts “both as to whether or
not there is in effect any regulation by Congress, and as to the au-
thority of Congress to make such regulation,”158 the court resolved
III, § 6). Like the original Art. I, § 2 of the Federal Constitution, the Virginia provision
contained a three-fifths clause. Id.
154. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. IV, § 55.
155. Brown, 166 S.E. at 107-08. For statistics about the district populations, see id. at 110
n.1. In 1868—not surprisingly, Virginia only drew its post-1860 districts once it was re-
admitted to the Union following the Civil War—for example, the ideal district size would have
been 152,489.75 people. The least populous district was only 5662 people below the ideal and
the most populous district was only 8244 people above the ideal. Id. The deviations in the
1872 plan and the 1883 plans were of similar magnitudes. The population disparities began
to rise with the post-1890 redistricting. See id.
156. J.K. Irving, Jr., Virginia Is Puzzled Over Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1932 at
E5, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1932/06/05/100755108.html?page
Number=67 [https://perma.cc/PJE3-K6RQ]. More precisely, the Virginia plan combined the
old Seventh and Tenth Districts, with the exception of three small counties, which were sent
to the Sixth District (a district that was also, albeit only slightly, overpopulated). See Brown,
166 S.E. at 111.
157. Brown, 166 S.E. at 106.
158. Id. at 109.
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the case entirely on state constitutional grounds. While “[m]athe-
matical exactness” was not required, especially in light of the rea-
sons not to split cities or counties between districts, section 55
required an attempt “in good faith” to satisfy principle of practical
population equality.159
The court rejected the government’s argument that congressional
redistricting was “a legislative matter, ... not subject to judicial re-
view.”160 While the job of drawing districts was, “in a sense, politi-
cal,” and the legislature thus had “necessarily wide discretion,” the
limits section 55 placed “on the discretion of the Legislature” were
judicially enforceable.161 Although there might be close cases, the
court had “no uncertainty” about its conclusion given the map before
it: “The inequality is obvious, indisputable, and excessive.”162 The
legislature could easily have drawn districts with more equal pop-
ulations through simply moving some counties into adjacent dis-
tricts.
Having found the district configurations unconstitutional, the
court was faced with the question of remedy. Precisely because
drawing districts was a legislative duty, the court concluded that it
“necessarily follow[ed]” from the absence of a valid legislative re-
districting, that “it will be necessary for the electors in the state
at large to select the nine members to represent the state in the
national Legislature.”163 The 1932 congressional elections in Vir-
ginia were thus conducted at large, with the Commonwealth’s one
Republican representative losing his seat—at the time, the sole seat
held by his party in the entire South.164 By 1934, the Common-
wealth returned to districted elections.165
159. Id. at 110.
160. Id. at 106.
161. Id. at 107.
162. Id. at 111.
163. Id.
164. Virginius Dabney, Virginia Court Rule Dashes G.O.P. Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, October 3,
1932, at E5, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1932/10/23/100868651.html?
pageNumber=73 [https://perma.cc/FVG7-63RM].
165. See Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting
Battles: Shifting from Rural Malapportionment to Voting Rights to Public Participation, 47
U. RICH. L. REV. 771, 779 (2013).
The next time the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the requirements of section 55 came
decades later. In Wilkins v. Davis, the court addressed the constitutionality of Virginia’s 1952
congressional districting legislation. 139 S.E.2d 849 (1965). Those districts were retained
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In Illinois, however, a decision striking down a post-1930 redis-
tricting on malapportionment grounds remained in effect, with even
more ironic consequences.166 The size of Illinois’s congressional del-
egation remained unchanged between 1910 and 1930, with twenty-
seven members.167 Nevertheless, Illinois redrew its congressional
districts in 1931.168 And it created districts whose populations
ranged from 158,738 in the smallest district to 541,785 in the
largest.169
The Supreme Court of Illinois struck down the plan on both fed-
eral and state law grounds. With respect to federal law, the court
had “no hesitancy” in concluding that the equipopulousity require-
ment in the 1911 Apportionment Act remained “in full force and ef-
fect.”170 It viewed the 1929 Act as directed solely at apportionment,
making no provision one way or the other “with reference to the
manner of electing representatives.”171 It saw nothing in the 1929
Act to “justif[y] the claim that it repealed the act of 1911, either in
without change after the 1960 census when a gubernatorial commission reported that “[t]o
bring the districts to approximately equal population would involve changes of doubtful
practicality, the dissolution of districts which have the greatest community of interest, and
mean a radical restructuring of the State.” Id. at 852. The Virginia Supreme Court
acknowledged that redrawing the districts might undercut the interest in having districts
reflect cohesive “communit[ies] of interest.” Id. at 853. But citing Brown v. Saunders, it
declared that “community of interest is not the only requirement, or even one of the
requirements spelled out in the Constitution. There must be, as nearly as practicable, an
equal number of inhabitants in the districts.” Id. Because it was possible to achieve far more
equality of population by redrawing the boundaries between districts, the plan was
unconstitutional. (The court also emphasized that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), requiring equipopulous congressional
districts as a matter of federal constitutional law, the Virginia plan was doubly unconsti-
tutional. Wilkins, 139 S.E.2d at 854.) Once again, however, the court declined to order the
State to redraw the districts, providing instead only that at-large elections would be used
until such a plan was drawn. Id. at 855.
166. See Moran v. Bowley, 179 N.E. 526, 526-27, 532 (Ill. 1932).
167. See Brief and Argument for Appellants at 19, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)
(No. 804). And yet, because of the State’s failure to draw additional congressional districts
when its delegation increased from twenty-five in 1901 to twenty-seven in 1910, the State had
been electing twenty-five representatives from districts and two at-large. See id. at 9 tbl.I, 19.
168. See id. at 19.
169. See Moran, 179 N.E. at 527; Brief and Argument for Appellants, supra note 167, at
19.
170. See Moran, 179 N.E. at 531.
171. Id. at 530.
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express terms or by implication ... so far as it relates to the forma-
tion of congressional districts.”172 To the contrary, the Illinois court
thought
[t]he conclusion [was] irresistible that Congress wanted to make
decennial apportionments a certainty and did not intend to
release its control over the manner of electing representatives.
We cannot bring ourselves to the belief that Congress intended
to forsake the field of legislation which it had completely oc-
cupied for more than half a century.173
Because it would have been eminently possible to reallocate coun-
ties between adjacent districts to create more equipopulous ones,
the 1931 map violated federal law.174
But even if it had not, the court held that the 1931 Illinois re-
districting act violated a provision of the Illinois Constitution that
required all elections to be “free and equal.”175 The court explained
that “[e]lections are equal when the vote of each voter is equal in its
influence upon the result to the vote of every other elector—where
each ballot is as effective as every other ballot.”176 Because districts
with different numbers of “inhabitants will work inequality in right
of suffrage and of power in elections of the representatives in Con-
gress,” the 1931 redistricting act was “not only obnoxious to the laws
of Congress but to the Constitution of this state.”177
But the Illinois court’s decision long predated the rise of struc-
tural reform injunctions in which courts either required the leg-
islature to develop a new proposal or drew the districts themselves.
Thus, the decision had the perverse consequence of simply reinstat-
ing the preexisting 1901 congressional map, which had even greater
population disparities, but which had not been challenged.178
172. Id. at 530-31.
173. Id. at 530.
174. See id. at 531-32.
175. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 18; see also Moran, 179 N.E. at 531-32.
176. Id. at 531.
177. Id. at 532.
178. See Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1057, 1068-69 (1958); see also Brief and Argument for Appellants, supra note 167, at 20
(noting that the result of “Moran v. Bowley ... was that the Court left in full force and effect the
much more offensive and flagrant Act of 1901, whose Congressional Districts were far more
unequal and discriminatory than even those set up in the 1931 Act” and that in the face of
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And when a new group of plaintiffs later did challenge those 1901
districts, the Illinois Supreme Court retreated. Citing the interven-
ing decision in Wood v. Broom, the Illinois court held “that there
were no Federal restrictions or limitations on the legislature in the
apportionment of the State for the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives in the Congress of the United States.”179
It then overruled its earlier position that the state constitutional
guaranty of equality in elections created an enforceable right, stat-
ing that that command was “primarily addressed to the legislative
branch of the government.”180 To argue that “every vote cast in one
district [sh]ould have the same effect as every vote cast in every
other district, is to assert a millennium which cannot be reached.”181
That 1901 Illinois congressional map lay at the heart of the
Supreme Court’s far better-known decision in Colegrove v. Green,182
the place where most contemporary discussions of redistricting and
reapportionment begin.183 In Colegrove, a seven-member Court re-
jected a federal constitutional and statutory challenge to the Illinois
map.184 Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion announcing the judg-
ment of the Court185 famously urged his colleagues “not to enter this
this “ridiculous result, ... one can only exclaim with Cicero: ‘O! Tempora, O! Mores!’ ”).
In an episode that was more Julius Caesar and Et tu, Brute? than Cicero’s orations, when
a judge tried to stop a litigant in a foreclosure suit from arguing about the legislature’s failure
to redistrict, the litigant pulled a gun and shot and killed the opposing lawyer. See Lawyer Is
Slain in Chicago Court: Litigant, Obsessed with Political Theory, Shoots at Judge Also, but
Misses Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1936, at L3. He explained that he killed the lawyer “to bring
forcibly to public attention his contention that the Supreme Court of Illinois was an illegal
body because of failure to reapportion legislative districts.” Id.; cf. Colegrove v. Green, 64 F.
Supp. 632, 633 (N.D. Ill.) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (remarking that Illinois’s forty-year
refusal to redistrict “provokes, if it does not invite the resort to arms if appeals to reason or
the patriotism of the individuals are too long ignored”), aff’d, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
179. Daly v. Madison County, 38 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ill. 1941).
180. Id. at 167.
181. Id.
182. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
183. See Lewis, supra note 178, at 1058.
184. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554, 556 (plurality opinion).
185. Justice Frankfurter wrote for himself and Justices Stanley Reed and Harold Burton.
See id. at 550. Justice Hugo Black wrote a dissent, joined by Justices William Douglas and
Francis Murphy. See id. at 566, 574 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black would have held that
the continued use of the 1901 districts violated both Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment because of the “glaringly unequal representation in the
Congress” it produced. See id. at 570-71. For these three Justices, “the constitutionally
guaranteed right to vote and the right to have one’s vote counted clearly imply the policy that
state election systems, no matter what their form, should be designed to give approximately
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political thicket.”186 That thicket, however, had already been
trimmed by the Court, as the Justice implicitly acknowledged when
he began his opinion by stating that the case could be “dispose[d] of
... on the authority of Wood v. Broom.”187 Indeed, the Justice
doubled down on the claim that the same Congress that had so
carefully considered which apportionment methods best served
population equality among the states had decided to abandon any
insistence on population equality within a state.188 He emphasized
that “seven Congressional elections” had subsequently taken
place—including two under the post-1940 apportionment—and “[n]o
manifestation has been shown by Congress even to question the
correctness of that which seemed compelling to this Court in
enforcing the will of Congress in Wood v. Broom.”189
But Justice Frankfurter went further. Not only did he reject the
idea that there was an affirmative federal statutory command to
draw districts with equal population, but he asserted that courts
should never intervene in redistricting controversies because they
equal weight to each vote cast.” Id. at 570. Justice Wiley Rutledge cast the deciding vote. See
id. at 564-66 (Rutledge, J.). Unlike the Frankfurter bloc, he assumed that the underlying
claim was justiciable, but he thought that equitable considerations militated in favor of
dismissing the suit because the only remedy he saw was to require the State to conduct its
congressional elections at large, depriving “Illinois citizens of [the] representation by districts
which the prevailing policy of Congress commands.” See id. While this would provide abstract
equality of representation, “the cure sought may be worse than the disease.” Id. at 566.
186. See id. at 556 (plurality opinion).
187. See id. at 551.
188. See id. Professor Margo Anderson, a leading historian of the census, has argued that
this duality was entirely intentional:
And so the ultimate “solution” to the reapportionment crisis created by the
growing power of the urban population of the nation was to reapportion congres-
sional seats among the states but to allow the states themselves to malapportion
those seats within the states.... [Congress] would cheat and change the rules of
the apportionment game to preserve rural and small-town dominance of legis-
lative halls for another generation. These actions eventually precipitated an-
other reapportionment crisis, the “reapportionment revolution” of the 1960s.
ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 157.
189. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 551 (plurality opinion). It seems entirely plausible that Con-
gress would similarly have acquiesced if the Supreme Court had affirmed the Mississippi and
Kentucky federal courts that had struck down those two states’ post-1930 congressional re-
districtings. Congressional inertia, particularly after the bruising battle that had eventually
been ended by the permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, is not a particularly powerful sign
that the Court properly gleaned Congress’s original intentions.
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involve an issue “of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not
meet for judicial determination.”190
Justice Frankfurter’s historical support for this proposition came
not from battles over redistricting, but from the history of apportion-
ment. He began by asserting that “[t]he one stark fact that emerges
from a study of the history of Congressional apportionment is its
embroilment in politics, in the sense of party contests and party
interests.”191 He then pointed to the Apportionments Clause direc-
tive that Congress apportion seats according to respective popula-
tion and wrote that “Congress has at times been heedless of this
command and not apportioned according to the requirements of the
Census.”192 But as we have already seen, there had been only one
such time—after the 1920 census.193 And while it was true that
states had frequently disregarded Congress’s directives that
districts be compact and have roughly equal numbers of inhabit-
ants, the Justice’s position that courts could not enforce such direc-
tives ultimately seemed to rest not so much on the political nature
of the plaintiffs’ claims, but rather on the limited nature of courts’
remedial powers:
[N]o court can affirmatively re-map the Illinois districts so as to
bring them more in conformity with the standards of fairness for
a representative system. At best we could only declare the
existing electoral system invalid. The result would be to leave
Illinois undistricted and to bring into operation, if the Illinois
legislature chose not to act, the choice of members for the House
of Representatives on a state-wide ticket. The last stage may be
worse than the first.194
In any event, Colegrove postponed the Court’s intervention into the
redistricting process for a generation.195 And when that intervention
190. See id. at 552.
191. Id. at 554.
192. Id. at 554-55.
193. See supra Part II.
194. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553 (plurality opinion).
195. See J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE
SUPREME COURT BROUGHT “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE UNITED STATES 5-6 (2014).
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came, it began with a decision, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, whose author
insisted it was “not Colegrove v. Green.”196
A major impetus for the Court’s entry into the political thicket
was its sense that underpopulated districts produced reactionary
policies, most notably in the Jim Crow South.197 Chief Justice
Warren “used to say that if Reynolds v. Sims had been decided
before 1954, Brown v. Board of Education would have been unneces-
sary.”198 The connection between districts frozen in time and the
inability of legislatures to address pressing national concerns was
well understood.199 Although the Court framed its decisions in the
one-person, one-vote cases in rhetorically individualistic terms,
everyone understood their racial implications.200 A primary conse-
quence of the one-person, one-vote cases was that they required
decennial redistricting focused on population equality, realigning
that process with the decennial reapportionment also focused on
population equality.201
196. 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
197. See SMITH, supra note 195, at 5-6.
198. John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974). Coincidentally, 1954 was
also the year when population disparities among congressional districts “prompted one
observer ... to refer to the lower chamber of Congress as the ‘House of Un-Representatives.’”
See SMITH, supra note 195, at 17.
199. See SMITH, supra note 195, at 5 (describing how “malapportionment served as a
cornerstone of white supremacy, ensuring the overrepresentation of the most ardent
segregationists”); id. at 131 (noting that in their brief in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963),
a malapportionment-based challenge to Georgia’s county unit system, the plaintiffs “explicitly
ma[de] the connection between [numerical] minority control and racial discrimination”);
Lewis, supra note 178, at 1065-66 (commenting on the consequences of malapportioned state
legislatures for civil rights); John F. Kennedy, The Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
1958, at 12, 37-38, http://tinyurl.com/JFK-Shame [https://perma.cc/A2JE-5WA5] (discussing
congressional failure to pass legislation regarding housing, education, and labor).
200. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Alabama Foundations of the Law of Democracy, 67 ALA.
L. REV. 415, 419 (2015).
201. In his dissent in Wesberry v. Sanders, the case imposing a constitutional requirement
of equipopulousity for congressional districts, Justice Harlan invoked the history of
apportionment legislation to argue that “the Court is not simply undertaking to exercise a
power which the Constitution reserves to the Congress; it is also overruling congressional
judgment.” 376 U.S. 1, 42 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
For a period of about 50 years, ... Congress, by repeated legislative act,
imposed on the States the requirement that congressional districts be equal in
population. (This, of course, is the very requirement which the Court now
declares to have been constitutionally required of the States all along without
implementing legislation.) Subsequently, after giving express attention to the
problem, Congress eliminated that requirement, with the intention of permitting
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CONCLUSION: FROM 1920 TO 2020
As we move into the round of post-2020 reapportionment and re-
districting, what lessons can we draw from the experience of 1920?
The relative stability of the permanent Reapportionment Act of
1929, which has remained essentially the same through decades
that saw fundamental transformations of American society and
politics,202 suggests the wisdom of a precommitment strategy be-
hind even a modest veil of ignorance. It is striking that Congress
managed to craft a default regime for reapportionment after more
than a century of heated contention, but that few jurisdictions have
managed to produce anything remotely similar with regard to re-
districting.
The historical experience with reapportionment also reminds us
that there can be a series of unintentional consequences over time
from choices about apportionment and redistricting processes.203
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wood v. Broom contributed to the
growing inequality among district populations that created the pres-
sure for its later declaration of a constitutional constraint on the
configuration of districts.
So, too, with the reliance on expert views to choose apportionment
rules. Both apportionment methods approved in the 1929 Reappor-
tionment Act—the method of major fractions and the method of
equal proportions (since 1941, the only approved method)204—were
proposed by relatively disinterested scholars.205 The Speaker of the
House sought to break the logjam by asking a National Academy of
the States to find their own solutions. Since then, despite repeated efforts to
obtain congressional action again, Congress has continued to leave the problem
and its solution to the States. It cannot be contended, therefore, that the Court’s
decision today fills a gap left by the Congress. On the contrary, the Court sub-
stitutes its own judgment for that of the Congress.
Id. at 45.
202. See supra Part II.
203. See ENGSTROM, supra note 36, at 43-44 (pointing out that the decision to require the
use of single-member districts in the 1842 Act was the upshot of the Whigs’ control over the
apportionment process and their desire to maintain their House majority in light of changing
conditions, showing how “even the seemingly most fundamental of political institutions can
be created out of short-term political considerations”).
204. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012).
205. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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Sciences panel to address the question, and Congress ultimately
accepted the panel’s advice.206 But by 1941, politics returned to the
process, and Congress chose the method of equal proportions as the
sole default measure because it transferred a seat from a Repub-
lican-dominated state to a solidly Democratic one.207 We can expect
in the post-2020 round of redistricting that social scientists will
again offer redistricting criteria. It will be especially interesting to
see whether the Supreme Court adopts any of the measures of
excessive partisanship that have been recently offered by schol-
ars.208 If it does, we should expect partisan interests to seek to use
the methods and measures in the service of seeking political ad-
vantage in the redistricting process.
At the opposite end of the empirical spectrum, just as we saw
claims of miscounts, fraud, and manipulation with respect to the
census figures in 1920,209 we might expect to see similar resistance
to the evidence post-2020. This resistance may be a reflection of an
era where politicians are already raising unsupported claims of vot-
er fraud and miscounted ballots.210
This feeds into a climate of rising anti-immigration sentiment.
The interaction of apportionment issues and immigration issues
that characterized the 1920s may well reappear during the post-
2020 round of redistricting. In 2016, the Supreme Court confronted
a version of this issue in Evenwel v. Abbott.211 A group of Texas
voters who lived in state legislative districts with particularly high
percentages of registered voters brought suit, claiming that Texas
should be required to equalize the number of eligible voters, rather
than the number of inhabitants within each district.212 As with the
analogous claim in the post-1920 debate, the choice would have
major political consequences, redistributing seats away from
206. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 12, at 55-56.
207. See supra note 109.
208. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 687-91 (summarizing some of the more
notable proposals). 
209. See EAGLES, supra note 12, at 38-39, 45-46.
210. See generally Jenna Johnson & Matt Zapotosky, Trump Seeks ‘Major Investigation’
into Unsupported Claims of Voter Fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/25/trump-seeks-major-investigation-into-unsupported-
claims-of-voter-fraud/?utm_term=.53684ce6b877 [https://perma.cc/QB7X-PWHG].
211. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I participated in
drafting the United States’ amicus brief in this case.
212. See id. at 1123.
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communities with large numbers of noncitizens and toward whiter,
and generally more conservative, communities.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ claims.213 Focusing initially on the history of congressional
apportionment, she pointed out that both the Framers and the Re-
construction Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment
used a population base, rather than a voter base, for allocating seats
in the House.214 Using a population base for state-level redistricting
was consistent with this constitutional history.215 But the Court
pointedly did not resolve whether “[s]tates may draw districts to
equalize voter-eligible population rather than total population.”216
I predict we will see efforts in several jurisdictions with growing
immigrant populations to use citizen-based, rather than total pop-
ulation-based, numbers for drawing districts.217 Those efforts will
raise, once again, fundamental questions about representation and
equality in a democracy.
Finally, we can expect that race will continue to play a significant
role, both express and implicit, in our politics. I would not be sur-
prised to see renewed attention post-2020, as we saw post-1920, to
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment—not so much with respect
to a realistic possibility that any state will actually lose seats in
Congress, but rather as a device for focusing attention on the var-
ious ways in which some states have moved to depress voter turn-
out, particularly among poor and minority communities.
Understanding the complex history of the post-1920 reappor-
tionment is hardly a roadmap to the post-2020 round. But as C.S.
Lewis reminded us long ago, understanding the past is valuable not
because “the past has any magic about it, but because we cannot
study the future, and yet need something to set against the present,
to remind us that ... much which seems certain to the uneducated
213. See id. at 1123, 1132.
214. See id. at 1127-29. 
215. See id. at 1124, 1128.
216. Id. at 1133 (emphasis added).
217. See Nathaniel Persily, Who Counts for One Person, One Vote?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1395, 1403-15 (2017) (discussing the practical problems with switching the basis of dis-
tricting).
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is merely temporary fashion.”218 Understanding how that reappor-
tionment played out, in a time of polarization, uncertainty, inequal-
ity, and cultural conflict, may give us at least a little traction as we
confront the question of how to allocate political power in yet an-
other such time.
218. C.S. LEWIS, Learning in War-Time, in THE WEIGHT OF GLORY AND OTHER ADDRESSES
43, 50-51 (1949).
